



SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL RESULTS  









The emergence of inflation targeting can be traced back to the 90’s when first 
countries started forming a new policy strategy aimed at price stabilisation with 
„real” inflation targeters using explicit numerical targets and some applying a 
similar strategy with implicit determinations. The monetary policy framework 
has been endowed with rich theoretical and practical content but an interesting 
real question remains unanswered: how recent appliers can cope with a number 
of unaccomplished tasks in model-building and implementation. It is the most 
exciting challenge for transition economies how to reconcile institutional changes 
with real and nominal convergence. The solution of this issue provides an ample 




Monetary policy seeking an inflation 
target is an important issue of economic 
policy  debates  in  our  days.  In  my  re-
search I am going to focus  on the evi-
dences of applying this monetary regime 
in the European Union and in the transi-
tion  countries.  The  inflation  targeting 
system entails a comprehensive concep-
tion  of  economic  policy  tools.  It  has 
found  application  in  various  industrial-
ized  and  emerging  countries.  The  new 
classical economics and the neutrality of 
money theory of Lucas have raised many 
doubts  concerning  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary policy interventions. Since the 
first  introduction  of  the  new  monetary 
policy  approach  based  on  inflation  tar-
geting numerous theoretical and empiri-
cal examinations have been carried out. 
Part of the research activity in this field 
aimed at comparing the effectiveness of 
curbing  inflation  of  money  targeting 
with inflation targeting or at classifying 
different practical versions of the regime. 
Some  economists  ventured  upon  con-
firming  theoretical  achievements  with 
econometric  analysis.  In  my  present 
study I am intending to give a summary 
on  the  above  findings,  pointing  at  the 
difficulties  of  model-making  and  esti-




The development of a new monetary 
policy approach after the worldwide high 
inflationary periods of the 70’s and the 
beginning of 80’s was a logical shift in 
economic theory. Lucas (1996) and other 
new classical economists pointed at the 
difficulty  of  influencing  economic  ac-
tors’  supply  and  demand  decisions  by 
any  economic  policy  action  reducing 
also monetary policy to a minimum role 
in affecting economic performance with 
little  bearing  on  real  variables  in  the Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
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short  run.  Another  theoretical  debate 
evolved around the mid 80’s, which fo-
cused  on  whether  monetary  policy  fol-
lowing  rules  or  applying  discretion  is 
more  efficient  in  achieving  its  goals. 
Among  others  the article  of  Barro  and 
Gordon (1983)
1 meant an important con-
tribution to the discussion. In effect the 
inflation targeting monetary policy bears 
the  characteristics  of  both,  it  entails  a 
strong commitment to a mid-term infla-
tion  target  but at  the  same  time   it  in-
cludes  many  discretionary  elements, 
therefore it can be regarded as a mixture 
of the two competing approach.    
 
WHAT IS INFLATION TARGETING? 
 
Frederic  Mishkin  himself  –  one  of 
the first scientists who started establish-
ing  the  theoretical  framework  of  infla-
tion targeting and emphasising its posi-
tive feature compared to other monetary 
regimes – in his early article on inflation 
targeting  prepared  in  co-operation  with 
Bernanke refers to this monetary policy 
strategy as a „broad framework for pol-
icy, which allows the central bank ’con-
strained discretion’, rather than an iron-
clad policy rule in the Friedman sense.”
2 
Furthermore, he gives a compound con-
ception  about  what  attributes  make  a 
monetary regime inflation targeting: (1) 
the definition and announcement of me-
dium-term  numerical  targets  for  infla-
tion, (2) an institutional commitment to 
price  stability  as  primary  goal,  (3)  a 
monetary  strategy  built  upon the  inclu-
                                                 
1  Barro,  Robert  and  David,  Gordon,  „Rules, 
Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary 
Policy”,  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics,  July 
1983, 12. 
2  Ben  S.  Bernanke-Frederic  Mishkin  (1997): 
Inflation  targeting:  a  new  policy  framework  for 
monetary  policy?  Abstract.  Working  Paper  5893. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
 
sion of information drawn from a wide 
range of variables, not just monetary ag-
gregates  or  the  exchange  rate,  (4)  a 
transparent  monetary  policy  which  is 
manifested  in  a  regular  communication 
of  monetary  policy  objectives,  instru-
ments and decisions with the public and 
markets, (5) increased accountability of 
the  central  bank  for  making  efforts  to 
achieve its inflationary target. The mone-
tary authority – according to this inter-
pretation  –  announces  a  target  level  of 
inflation which allows for a gradual tran-
sition  from  the  current  to  the  desired 
steady state level of inflation to ensure 
price stability (usually a zero to two per-
cent  of  annual rate  of  price  change) in 
the  economy.  The  question  is  whether 
inflation targets materially affect private 
sector expectations of inflation. The of-
ten  raised  criticism  against  any  goal 
variable determining monetary strategy – 
such as an intermediate inflation goal - is 
that it is relatively unpredictable. Lars E. 
O. Svensson (1997), (2005) speaks about 
optimal  inflation  targeting  (further  on 
IT) in that he regards the best possible 
intermediate  target  the  current  forecast 
of the goal variable itself. By defining an 
optimal monetary policy, he uses an ex-
plicit  intertemporal  loss  function,  and 
models  the  forecasting  and  decision 
process regarding the projections of the 
instrument rate and target variables.  
His  definition  on  inflation  targeting 
comprehends: 
(1) An explicit monetary policy objec-
tive in the form of a numerical inflation 
target, with an explicit concern not only 
about  the  stability  of  inflation  but  also 
about  the  stability  of  the real  economy 
which is manifested in the choice of tar-
get  variables  (including  both  inflation 
and  a  real  variable  such  as  the  output 
gap). 
(2) An  internal  decision  process  – 
„forecast targeting” – where projections  
 
104
of the target variables play a prominent 
role and the central bank sets the instru-
ment rate so that the forecast of the tar-
get  variables  is  relatively  close  to  the 
monetary-policy objective. 
(3) A  very  high  degree  of  transpar-
ency and accountability, where the cen-
tral  bank  typically  announces  internal 
projections and makes a strong commit-
ment while the detailed external scrutiny 
of the bank’s performance is resolved. 
He recommends the improvement on 
all the three points of his definition – that 
is what he aims at by using mathematical 
models  –  and  names  flexible  inflation 
targeters those, who try to meet the in-
flation  target  by  stabilising  the  real 
economy  (keeping  e.g.  a  stable  output 
gap).  He  supports  those  policy-makers 
which  make  forecasts  for  an  entire  in-
strument-rate  path  and  corresponding 
projections on target variables by influ-
encing  private  sector  expectations  on a 
longer horizon. In setting up models for 
maximising  central  bank  utility  he  pre-
sumes  that  certainty  equivalence  holds 
(the  combination  of  linear  models  and 
quadratic loss  functions imply this pre-
condition):  For  addressing  a  possible 
ambiguity of  a non-adequate specificati-
on of a medium-term objective and lack 
of  transparency,  Svensson  recommends 
to use an explicit loss function as the op-
erational  objective  of  the  central  bank. 
The possible way of stating such a func-
tion can be given in the following man-
ner: 
Ltş
2 2 ) ( t t x l p p + -
* ,  where 
the first part of the equation shows the 
loss  deriving  from  the  difference  be-
tween the optimal and the up-to-date rate 
of  inflation  and  the  second  part  stands 
for the deviation of real variables from 
their optimal value (e.g. the output gap) 
multiplied by the relative weight (l ) of 
stabilisation  efforts  comparing  to  infla-
tion stabilisation attempts, which can be 
best chosen by a voting procedure of the 
decision-makers of the monetary author-
ity.  (Instrument-rate  changes  and  ex-
change rate changes can also be included 
in this function as target variables.) The 
explicit  intertemporal  loss  function  is 
then a sum of current and expected fu-
ture losses and takes the form: 






= ĺ ,  where  d is  a  dis-
count factor expressing the time prefer-
ences of the central bank. 
If  there  are  different  projections 
made  at  present  on  future  instrument 
levels,  the  central  bank  should  choose 
the  instrument-rate  plan  that  results  in 
the  inflation  and  output-gap  projection 
with the lowest loss. In sum, the explicit 
loss function states the target variables, 
and the intra- and intertemporal substitu-
tion  between  them.  For  instrument-rate 
assumptions there are different methods 
which help drawing up projections (the 
use  of  a  constant  instrument  rate/CIR/, 
the market expectations of future instru-
ment rates /ME/ or the Taylor-type rule). 
As certainty equivalence does not always 
hold (when uncertainty is multiplicative 
and not additive) mean target projections 
– like previously introduced – have to be 
replaced  by  (probability)  distribution 
forecast targeting.        
 
STRUCTURAL MODELS FOR  
FORECASTING INFLATION 
 
The models used by central banks to 
forecast inflations have a lot of elements 
in  common:  (1)  they  include  an  open 
economy  demand  curve,  (2) a  Phillips-
curve  relationship,  (3)  an  international 
asset  market  equilibrium  condition  and 
(4)  a  monetary  reaction  function.  
Macro-econometric models having been 
aimed  at  empirically  investigating  IT 
systems  and  main  macro-econometric Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
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models of leading central banks – such 
as the Bank of Canada and the U.S Fed-
eral Reserve use these elements as start-
ing point to produce forecasts. In nowa-
days’ global economy two of the triad of 
the  world’s  leading    economic  forces: 
Japan and the US does not have an ex-
plicit  inflation  targeting  strategy  not-
withstanding the European Central Bank 
with  its  0-2%  annual  explicit  inflation 
rule. To understand, however, how such 
a  model  projecting  inflation  and  other 
real variables behaves in practice a good 
example is provided by Richard Dennis 
(2005),  who  compared  the  inflationary 
path of the US economy without an ex-
plicit inflation target with the imaginary 
situation of the same applying an explicit 
target for the period over a 25 years’ pe-
riod (1980-2005). He uses a small-scale 
dynamic  New-Keynesian  model  of  the 
business cycle with sticky prices by ad-
dressing the issues of time inconsistency 
through  considering  the  possibilities  of 
the central bank exerting a policy of both 
commitment and discretion. In the sim-
ple  macroeconomic  model  firms  in  the 
output market are monopolistically com-
petitive and hire workers in a perfectly 
competitive labour market. The price ri-
gidity  assumption  is  supported  by  a 
Calvo pricing scheme, where in each pe-
riod a proportion of firms (1-x ) is able 
to  reoptimize  its  price-forming.  Taking 
the pricing assumptions mentioned so far 
and using the subjective discount factor 
b  the Phillips-curve –equation is stated 
as follows: 
(1) 
t t t t t c m E ˆ
) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
1 1
1















where  t c m ˆ denotes real marginal costs. 
The demand side is represented by an 
infinitely living household spending their 
income on consumption (Ct), habit con-


























L H C u b   
The  household’s  –  being  the  only 
beneficiary  of  the  lump-sum  dividend 
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where B t  denotes nominal bond stock, 
R t the nominal interest rate, and  Wt the 
nominal wage rate. 
To estimate parameters Dennis uses a 
Taylor-type rule describing the nominal 
interest rate path: 
(4)  
[ ] t t t t t t R c E R e f f p f f f + + + + - = - - + 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 3 ˆ ) 1 ( , 
where parameters  1 f  and  2 f  symbolise 
the  response  parameters  of  the  central 
bank to movements in  expected inflation 
and consumption gap, while  3 f captures 
the  monetary  policy  gradualism.  To 
characterise the way monetary policy is 
to be optimised he uses a loss function 
minimizing  the  deviation  of    inflation 
from  its  target  level,  consumption  gap 
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where all parameters are communicated 
to the public (including of course the in-
flation target 
* p . 
Through  calibrating  the  model  with 
inflation targeting Dennis compared the 
economic  outcome  under  explicit  infla-
tion  target  with  actual  data  of  the  25 
years’  period  under  examination  (both  
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under commitment and discretion). The 
two time series showed negligible differ-
ence  with  the  estimated  data  once  lag-
ging  behind  (relatively  strongly  in  the 
80’s), once surpassing the actual values. 
The result would lead us to make con-
clusions on inflation targeting as a policy 
strategy nothing more effective than oth-
ers  though  the  US  Fed  have  strongly 
committed itself to an implicit inflation 
target throughout the last decades, which 
is de facto very similar to inflation tar-
geting  (Mishkin,  1997)  and  based  on  a 
well – defined implicit target as shown 
by Daniel Leigh (2005) in his research 
applying  a  modified  Taylor-rule  with 









t y r g p p b p + - - + + =
* * ) )( 1 ( , 
where i
* is the target level of nominal 
interest  rate  (here:  federal  funds  rate), 
t
e p is expected inflation (inflation fore-
cast), yt is the output gap, r
n is the natu-
ral rate of real interest and 
* p  is the in-
flation target. 
The scope of the present paper does 
not allow listing all the numberless mod-
els  and model  building  possibilities  for 
different  types  of  economies  –  even 
those  applying  explicit  inflation  targets 
and  fully  complying  with  the  prerequi-
sites of the monetary policy regime un-
der examination - with different degrees 
of  openness,  output,  inflation,  interest 
rate  and  exchange  rate  volatility  and 
various  qualitative  variables.  On  the 
whole,  these  mathematical  formulas 
serve  the  fulfilment  of  the  rationale  of 
inflation targeting: the achievement of a 
greater  stability  of  output  and  employ-
ment  in  the  short-run  while  ensuring 
price  stability  in  the  long-run  through 
well-anchored expectations. Researchers 
and  experts have  not  found  a  common 
ground about what IT means in terms of 
implementable  policy  rule.  Taylor-rule 
or other policy rules with long-run fixed 
inflation targets or the solution of a cen-
tral bank optimisation problem in a ra-
tional expectation model is how an IT is 
often identified. For small, open econo-
mies and transition countries – such as 
Hungary  –  a  model  with  imperfect 
knowledge  is  advisable  where  „private 
agents attempt to infer the central bank’s 
goals and reactions through past actions” 
(Williams,  2006).  Suggestions  towards 
these  countries  (e.g.:  Mishkin,  2003) 
have  touched  upon  that these  countries 
include a focus on limiting exchange rate 
fluctuations  in  their  inflation  targeting 
regime which should also appear in the 




Some authors, despite the results of 
comparisons  between  explicit  and  im-
plicit rules in the USA, take a stand for 
inflation targeting as the best monetary 
policy approach. Some empirical inves-
tigations carried out – among others – by 
Hu (2003) and Wu (2004) encompassing 
a large number of industrialised, transi-
tion and emerging countries have proved 
that inflation targeting is a more success-
ful monetary policy strategy than others 
in  both  real  and  inflation  stabilisation. 
Previous  econometric  analyses  attached 
the  positive  disinflationary  tendencies 
evolving  in  all  OECD  countries  in  the 
last 20 years to an overall „generic re-
gression to mean” and failed to confirm 
the  superiority  of  the  IT  regime  over 
other strategies geared at price stability 
(Neumann  –  von  Hagen,  2002;  Ball  – 
Sheridan, 2003). These studies, however, 
relied on a very small sample and a short 
time-scale.  The  research  of  Yifan  Hu 
spread  over  a  group  of  66  countries, 
among which he distinguished inflation Gazdálkodás Vol. 51. Special edition No. 19 
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targeters (22) and potential inflation tar-
geters  (44),  and  covered  a  twenty–year 
period (1980-2000). For the clear delimi-
tation  of  countries  with  an  IT  regime 
from  those  following  another  approach 
he took advantage of the classification of 
Truman (2003) to characterise countries 
belonging  to  inflation  targeters:  (1) 
adopting price stability, (2) articulating a 
numerical target or a sequence of targets, 
(3) establishing a time horizon to reach 
the target, and (4) creating an evaluation 
system to review whether the target has 
been  met.  Hu  applied  22  variables,  of 
which  9  expressed  economic  condi-
tions/performance, 8 examined the eco-
nomic structure and three the quality of 
economic  institutions.  Countries  with 
utmost initial inflation rates and less than 
five year experience of application were 
dropped  from  the  sample.  Through  the 
evaluation  of  descriptive  statistics  Hu 
found a positive relationship between in-
flation  and  output  variability  and  thus 
came to a result contradicting the Taylor-
rule  presuming a  trade-off  between  the 
two variable and proved that the IT re-
gime has a positive impact on economic 
performance, on output growth. Further-
more,  the  examination  confirmed  that 
countries  having  stabilised  the  annual 
level of price increase are more in favour 
of the application, which again underpins 
the  assumption  that  inflation  targeting 
does play an important role in lowering 
the  level  of  inflation  and  increasing  its 
predictability  as  some  authors  (e.g. 
Johnson,  2002;  Mishkin  –  Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001) stated previously. 
Thomas  Y.  Wu  examined  22  OECD 
industrial countries over a 27 years’ ho-
rizon  and  investigated  the  character  of 
their  monetary  regime  with  special  re-
gard to  interest rate  policy  and the  be-
haviour of the inflation rate throughout 
this period. The rationale behind this ap-
proach is that real interest rate is a chan-
nel  in  the  transmission  mechanism 
through which the short run nominal in-
terest rate set by the monetary authority 
affects the inflation rate.  Data were ana-
lysed  in  a  multi-period  differences-in-
differences  framework  as  the  starting 
date of adopting inflation targeting var-
ies across the 8 countries of the „treat-
ment group” (among with the revolution-
ist  –  New  Zealand  - as  first  applier in 
1990  to  the  last    –  Switzerland  –  in 
2000).  The  examination  revealed  two 
important findings: (1) countries adopt-
ing the IT regime have experienced sig-
nificant gains from a higher than average 
decrease in their average inflation rates, 
(2) this favourable result can not simply 
be  attributed  to  an  „aggressive  interest 
rate” policy as these countries can not be 
characterised with a strong rise in their 
real interest rate levels. The empirical re-
search  carried  out  to  estimate  the  effi-
ciency  of  inflation  targeting  has  hence 
yielded  very  interesting,  significant  but 
sometimes  contradictory  results  which 
need  further  investigation.  The  reason 
why it is too early to draw final conse-
quences is the short period of time with 
comparable  data  and  the  diverse  eco-
nomic and institutional characteristics of 
countries that have been or should from 
now on be submitted to examination. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Through the effective gearing of in-
flation  and  positive  impact  of  real  per-
formance  of  the  economies  and  with  a 
successful history  of 25  years from the 
first  application  inflation  targeting  still 
raises many issues to  be addressed. As 
the range of inflation targeters includes 
both emerging countries with high start-
ing inflation rates to industrialised coun-
tries  with relative  initial  price  stability, 
different policy rules and modelling pro-
cedures should be applied both for theo- 
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retical investigations and during practical 
usage. Among a great number of ques-
tions still unsolved some considering in-
strumental  problems  (absence  of  other 
nominal  anchor,  the  influence  of  fiscal 
stance, the influence of the exchange rate 
mechanism on price stability and its role 
in the transmission process, the choice of 
the target variable, the target width and 
horizon etc.) and others institutional at-
tributes  (overall  transparency,  account-
ability of the central bank, the potential 
application  of  escape  clauses,  institu-
tional independence etc.) countries with 
little experience have a lot to work on re-
fining or redefining their strategy. Espe-
cially transition countries are facing a di-
lemma, how to conduct an independent 
monetary policy  with an IT regime be-
fore  losing  partial  independence  on  the 
threshold of joining the EMU? Are there 
country-specific  rules  for  these  econo-
mies or should they follow suit with ad-
vanced economies? Does  inflation tar-
geting leave enough room for manoeuvre 
also  in  the  case  of  potential  external 
shocks  and  exchange  rate  fluctuations? 
How can the objectives of price stability 
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